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Introduction
over roughly the past fifteen years there has been an explosion of scholarship in
comparative political thought. there have been numerous articles and monographs
published on the political thought of islam, confucianism, africa, and other tradi
tions.1 curiously, virtually none of this work has focused on Buddhism and polit
ical theory, despite the facts that Buddhism is the fourth or fifth largest religion in the
world, that its teachings guide hundreds of millions of people, and that several asian
nations identify their governments as being guided by Buddhist principles. indeed,
over the past thirty to forty years, there has been only a trickle of political theory
scholarship published in English that seriously discusses Buddhism.2
this oversight is unfortunate because Buddhism proposes a theory of politics that
both is distinct from Western theories and poses a plausible and attractive alterna
tive to them. in particular, Buddhism proposes a theory of politics that is deflationary
about the importance of politics in human lives, that rests on an immanent theory of
morality, and that articulates a compelling and helpful argument that our sense of
personal identity is a harmful illusion.
However, asking what “Buddhism” says about politics is roughly like asking
what “christianity” says about politics—it’s an impossibly large and vague task. the
existing literature on “Buddhism and politics” breaks down into a number of main
types: descriptive literature about how Buddhists have actually engaged in politics
and/or are doing so today;3,4 normative literature about what Buddhism (or Bud
dhists) say about whether (and how) Buddhists should engage in politics;5 historical/
sociological literature on the social and political context within which Buddhism first
arose;6 literature on Buddhist ethics, some of which touches on politics;7 and polit
ical advocacy from a Buddhist standpoint.8
to make the present task manageable, i have narrowed the topic in two ways.
First, this essay only examines what canonical Buddhism says about politics. “ca
nonical Buddhism”9 refers to the contents of the Pāli canon, which is the scripture of
one tradition of Buddhism (theravada) and is recognized by the other traditions
(mahāyāna and Vajrayāna) as being authentically the teachings of the Buddha. thus,
whatever conclusions we can draw about political theory from the Pāli canon are
relevant to all Buddhists, though some Buddhists may believe that there are other
valid teachings on these topics as well. second, this essay only considers those pas
sages in the Pāli canon that appear to contain what i will call “normative political
theorizing.” Given the plurality of interests and approaches among political theo-
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rists,10 any description of political theory will be controversial. in this case, what i
mean by “normative political theorizing” is texts that appear to offer either advice or
judgments about how politics ought to be conducted. thus, for example, there are
many, many passages in the Pāli canon that mention kings,11 but only a handful that
appear to give advice about how kings should behave.
although political theorists have largely ignored Buddhism, there is an existing
literature from other disciplines on the Pāli canon and normative political theory.
Within that literature there are three debates that bear on the current essay. the first
debate is over whether canonical Buddhism contains a theory of politics at all, or
whether the various comments about politics in the Pāli canon are better understood
as parables, illustrations, and comments on important contemporary events. max
Weber influentially argued that Buddhism is entirely unconcerned with politics,12
while contemporary scholars like stanley tambiah, steven collins, richard Gard,
and Balkrishna Gokhale have argued that politics plays at least some role in the ca
nonical teachings. as i argue below, the evidence of the primary texts makes clear
that there is indeed a normative political theory in the Pāli canon, one that has been
underappreciated.
the second debate is over whether any theory of politics ostensibly put forward
in the canonical texts supports monarchy or some form of republicanism, which in
this context means broader popular participation in decision making (though typi
cally nothing approaching even the level of semidemocratic participation of contem
poraneous athens). Here, the clearly dominant view is that the canonical political
theory of Buddhism supports monarchy,13 though a handful of scholars argue that
that reading is mistaken, and that there is a subtle but detectable preference for re
publicanism.14 this issue will also be addressed below, though i will argue that the
issue of the particular political system embraced by the Pāli canon is less important
than the question of the underlying theory of politics.
the third and final debate is over the role or significance of politics within Bud
dhism overall. on the one hand, some scholars argue that any politics in the Pāli
canon is relatively peripheral to the main concerns of Buddhism, which are primar
ily about individual salvation,15 while other scholars argue that politics and salvation
cannot be separated in the Buddhist theory, and thus that politics should be under
stood as central to Buddhism.16 this question is central to my discussion below,
where i argue that politics is distinctly secondary to individual salvation, and to some
degree actually irrelevant.
The Relevant Canonical Texts
there is a scholarly consensus on which passages of the Pāli canon offer normative
commentary about politics (and related issues like the distribution of resources or
social class). the passages that are widely seen as relevant to normative political
theory are the Aggañña Sutta, the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta, the Mahāsudassana
Sutta, the beginning of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, and various discussions in the
Jātaka Tales about the ten duties of the righteous king (the Rajādhamma), such as in
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Jātaka 385.17 (a few other tangentially relevant texts will be mentioned below.) i will
briefly summarize these key texts.
Aggañña Sutta
the Aggañña Sutta18 purports to be an explanation of the origin of the four main
castes: Brāhmaṇa (clergy and teachers), Khattiya (warriors), Vessa (farmers and mer
chants), and Sudda (servants and peasants). it is widely accepted among scholars that
it is intended to be a satire of Vedic origin myths, in that it undermines Vedic claims
for the intrinsic superiority of the Brahmins.19 the story begins as a creation myth
about the origin of the cosmos (though apparently the cosmos has no true beginning,
only periods of expansion and contraction):
there comes a time, Vāseṭṭha [the name of the Buddha’s Brahmin interlocutor], when,
sooner or later after a long period, this world contracts. . . . But sooner or later, after
a very long period, this world begins to expand again. at a time of expansion . . .
beings . . . are mostly reborn in this world. Here they dwell, mind-made, feeding on de
light, self-luminous, moving through the air, glorious—and they stay like that for a very
long time.20

as the world continues to become more material and less ethereal, “savoury
earth” spreads itself out on the surface of the ocean. one of the beings tastes it, and
craving arises in that being. seeing the first being enjoying the savory earth, other
beings taste it, and craving arises in them. as these beings continue to eat, they lose
their luminosity, and slowly transform from being mind-made to being matter-made.
this same process occurs several times, with several different kinds of foods, and
each time the beings become more bodily and also more disposed to misconduct of
various kinds, such as arrogance, spite, lust, and so on.
With each successive coarsening of the bodies and characters of the beings, the
foods available to them become less tasty and harder to obtain. Eventually we reach
a stage where the main food is rice, which needs to be cultivated with the familiar
degree of steady effort. this leads the beings to divide the fields into individual plots,
so that each person could be assured of reaping the benefits of his or her own labor.
But ownership inevitably leads to theft.21
to solve the ongoing problem of theft, the beings decide to appoint one among
them to serve as enforcer of the rules. this appears to be a simple social contract
(though see below):
then those beings came together and lamented the arising of these evil things among
them: taking what was not given, censuring, lying and punishment. and they thought:
“suppose we were to appoint a certain being who would show anger where anger was
due, censure those who deserved it, and banish those who deserved banishment! and in
return, we would grant him a share of the rice.” so they went to the one among them who
was the handsomest, the best-looking, the most pleasant and capable, and asked him to
do this for them in return for a share of the rice, and he agreed.22
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this king, whose title was mahā-sammata, which the text argues means “Peo
ple’s choice,” was the first khattiya, which the text argues means “lord of the
Fields.”23 some of the people in this society began to reflect on the evils that had
arisen, and committed themselves to refraining from evil: “‘they Put aside Evil and
Unwholesome things’ is the meaning of Brahmin, which is the first regular title to be
introduced for such people.”24 Finally, the names for the vessa and sudda castes are
simply occupational titles—merchants and hunters.25 Hence, the Vedic division of
castes is purely historical and occupational, and the castes reflect nothing about
the origins or natural qualities of their members. Further, the Buddha’s own khattiya
caste were originally the political and social leaders, as opposed to the brahmins
valorized by the Vedic literature.
Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta
right next to the Aggañña Sutta in the Dīgha Nikāya comes the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda
Sutta. this sutta (skt: sūtra) concerns a cakkavatti or “wheel-turning monarch.” the
Buddha’s first sermon after achieving enlightenment was called the Dhammacakkap
pavattana Sutta, or the sutta on the turning of the Wheel of Dhamma.26 Dhamma
(skt: dharma) in this context means truth or teaching, and in that first sermon the Bud
dha’s teaching set the truth rolling through the world. coomaraswamy argues that
the wheel, the dhamma cakka, is related to pre-Buddhist images that represent the
revolution of the year, especially the movement of the sun, and that it is intended to
represent the totality of existence. in Buddhist iconography, the wheel more nar
rowly symbolizes the dhamma—the truth of the world, and/or the truth of the Bud
dha’s teaching.27
the cakkavatti or wheel-turning monarch is a king who advances the dhamma
through his governance. a basic description of how a king becomes a wheel-turner,
and of the seven treasures that he obtains by doing so, is given in the Mahāsudassana
Sutta.28 Very briefly, a king can only become a cakkavatti through achieving personal
moral purity, and then can only maintain that status through ruling in a way that en
courages the people to also achieve moral purity. the symbol of a king’s status as a
cakkavatti is the Wheel treasure, which is apparently a visible but magical wheel that
allows the king to peacefully conquer and rule neighboring states. the Cakkavatti
Sīhanāda Sutta recounts what happens when a cakkavatti rules in the wrong way.
the story begins with daḷhanemi, a wheel-turning monarch who realizes that he
is reaching the end of his life and decides to spend his last days seeking spiritual
wisdom as a wandering ascetic. after the king leaves the kingdom, the Wheel trea
sure disappears. the newly crowned king consults the royal sage, who explains that
the Wheel treasure cannot be passed from one king to another but must be earned
by each king individually fulfilling the duties of a wheel-turning monarch, which are
as follows: “you should establish guard, ward, and protection according to Dhamma
for your own household, your troops, your nobles and vassals, for Brahmins and
householders, town and country folk, ascetics and Brahmins, for beasts and birds. let
no crime prevail in your kingdom, and to those who are in need, give property.”29
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that king and the next seven of his successors follow this advice and become
wheel-turners. But the eighth makes the fatal mistake: “[H]e ruled the people accord
ing to his own ideas, and, being so ruled, the people did not prosper as they had
done under the previous kings who had performed the duties of a wheel-turning
monarch.”30 He tries to mend his ways, but doesn’t follow the sages’ advice care
fully; in particular, he does not give property to the needy. this leads the poor to steal;
interestingly, the king’s initial response is to give the thieves enough property that
they don’t need to steal anymore, but eventually the king realizes that this will have
the perverse effect of encouraging theft. the king decides to execute the next thief,
which has the unintended consequence of legitimating the use of force, thus making
theft both more common and more dangerous.
this starts a cycle of moral degradation, parallel to the one in the Aggañña Sutta
in which physical craving for food leads to moral degradation:
thus, from the not giving of property to the needy, poverty became rife, from the growth
of poverty, the taking of what was not given increased, from the increase of theft, the use
of weapons increased, from the increased use of weapons, the taking of life increased—
and from the increase in the taking of life, people’s life-span decreased, their beauty de
creased, and [as] a result of this decrease of life-span and beauty, the children of those
whose life-span had been eighty-thousand years lived for only forty thousand.31

this same cycle continues, with novel crimes being committed (always caused by the
previous crime), until the life span is only one hundred years—that is, until today.
the Buddha predicts that in the future there will be further degradation, until the life
span is only ten years. then the cycle reverses:
and for those of a ten-year life-span, there will come to be a “sword interval” of seven
days, during which they will mistake one another for wild beasts. sharp swords will ap
pear in their hands and, thinking: “there is a wild beast!” they will take each other’s lives
with those swords. But there will be some beings who will think: “let us not kill or be
killed by anyone! let us make for some grassy thickets or jungle-recesses or clumps of
trees, for rivers hard to ford or inaccessible mountains, and live on roots and fruits of
the forest.” and this they will do for seven days. then, at the end of the seven days, they
will emerge from their hiding-places and rejoice together of one accord, saying: “Good
beings, i see that you are alive!” and then the thought will occur to those beings: “it is
only because we became addicted to evil ways that we suffered this loss of our kindred,
so let us now do good! What good things can we do? let us abstain from the taking of
life—that will be a good practice.” and so they will abstain from the taking of life, and,
having undertaken this good thing, will practise it. and through having undertaken such
wholesome things, they will increase in life-span and beauty. and the children of those
whose life-span was ten years will live for twenty years.32

in the future, when the life span has again reached eighty thousand years, a new
Buddha will appear, named metteya. at the same time, a new cakkavatti will arise,
named sankha. the two will rule the two spheres—spiritual and temporal—side by
side, by implication creating the best possible human society. Ultimately, sankha will
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become a disciple of metteya and achieve enlightenment, thus demonstrating the
superiority of the spiritual to the temporal.
there appears to be widespread agreement among scholars that this story repre
sents a novel theory in the history of indian political thought, often referred to as
the two Wheels of Dhamma33 —the identification of both religious life and political/
social life as being governed by the same underlying moral laws, and the assertion
that ultimately the temporal powers were subordinate to the spiritual powers.34
this theory is frequently contrasted with the realist theory of politics put forward by
Kautilya in the later Arthasastra. later Buddhist thinkers identified King aśoka (died
ca. 238 b.c.e.) as having been a wheel-turning monarch.35
Mahāparinibbāna Sutta
the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta is the last of the major canonical passages that appears
to offer normative political guidance (more on the Jātaka tales below). in this pas
sage, the Buddha learns that King ajātasattu intends to attack the Vajjians. the king
sends a minister to the Buddha to inform him of this plan, and to report back to the
king whatever the Buddha says in response. the Buddha tells the minister that he had
previously advised the Vajjians to follow seven principles, and that as long as they
followed these principles they would prosper and not decline. the seven principles
were: (1) “hold regular and frequent assemblies”; (2) “meet in harmony, break up in
harmony, and carry on their business in harmony”; (3) “do not authorise what has not
been authorised already, and do not abolish what has been authorised, but proceed
according to what has been authorised by their ancient tradition”; (4) “honour, re
spect, revere and salute the elders among them, and consider them worth listening
to”; (5) “do not forcibly abduct others’ wives and daughters and compel them to live
with them”; (6) “honour, respect, revere and salute the Vajjian shrines at home and
abroad, not withdrawing the proper support made and given before”; and (7) ensure
“that proper provision is made for the safety of arahants [enlightened beings], so
that such arahants may come in future to live there, and those already there may
dwell in comfort.”36
the subtext of all of this is that the Vajjians had a quasi-republican form of gov
ernment. some scholars have read this passage to say that the Buddha had told
the Vajjians to uphold their republican traditions, and thus implicitly was criticizing
monarchy. on this reading, it is significant that the aggressive king is ajātasattu, who
had murdered his spiritually advanced father, Bimbisāra, to obtain the throne. (Else
where in the Pāli canon the Buddha reveals that, after his death and due to his spiri
tual virtue, Bimbisāra was reborn in one of the heavenly realms, and that he would
achieve enlightenment after only one more human birth, thus demonstrating that
political leaders can make spiritual progress.37) Bolstering this reading, the Buddha
then gives parallel advice to his monks about how they should govern the sangha (the
community of monks) after his death. the structure of the sangha, which the Buddha
himself had set up, was republican. For example, there was no leader of the sangha,
and all decisions were made in open meetings, where all monks had equal rights to
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make proposals and vote. indeed, given that the sangha was the only community that
the Buddha ever created, some have argued that we should see it as representing his
preferred model of social organization.38 Further, the Buddha had grown up in a so
ciety governed by semi-republican principles, though during his lifetime that form of
government was rapidly disappearing.39
Jātaka Texts
Finally, there are passing comments about normative political theory in the Jātaka
texts, parables about the previous incarnations of the Buddha. in a number of places,
they list a series of duties to be observed by kings who would be righteous. these
Rajādhamma duties are as follows: “alms, morals, charity, justice and penitence,
Peace, mildness, mercy, meekness, patience.”40
The Political System of Canonical Buddhism
it will be helpful for us to distinguish between the political system that the Pāli canon
texts endorse and the theory of politics that underlies that endorsement. although
this reading will require some elaboration, in brief the political system that the Pāli
canon texts endorse is enlightened monarchy based on a primal social contract. the
king’s authority originally arose from the consent of the governed, but is maintained
by the spiritual righteousness of the king himself. the king’s legitimate power extends
to preserving order and preventing extreme poverty, though the people apparently
have no right to resist even an incompetent or evil king, and there appears to be
no possibility of reopening the terms of the social contract. social and political in
equality are an inescapable fact of life, though they are based on human conventions
rather than on any natural or spiritual differences among the people. Cakkavattis will
not need to use violence, but inferior kings will inevitably rely on it, though even
such semi-legitimate violence is ultimately socially destructive.
this brief summary of the political system that is laid out by the Pāli canon
touches on three controversies in the existing literature that need to be addressed
before we move on. First, legal scholar andrew Huxley has objected to reading the
Aggañña Sutta as depicting a social contract, on the grounds that the Buddha’s so
ciety had no tradition of legal contracts to draw upon—the ideas of mutually inde
pendent parties voluntarily accepting certain duties and obligations, and of a breach
either dissolving the relationship or justifying coercion, simply were not available.
Huxley suggests that instead we should read the Aggañña Sutta as depicting merely
the necessity that those governed accept or acquiesce in being ruled.41 However, as
steven collins argues in response to Huxley, we can read a bit more into the Agga
ñña Sutta, even if we accept the point that we cannot treat it as simply another in
stance of social-contract theory.42 First, as i noted above, we can read the Aggañña
Sutta as a statement of the moral equality of persons, and also of their original social
equality. second, we can read the Aggañña Sutta as a claim that the only way that
original social equality could justifiably have been broken was through the choice of
the society itself. third, we can find in the Aggañña Sutta some rudimentary criteria
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for judging the performance of kings, though not the later idea found in the socialcontract tradition that failure on their part could give rise to justifiable rebellion. For
these reasons, it is reasonable to discuss the Aggañña Sutta as depicting something
closely analogous to a social contract, even if that exact model was not available at
the time of its composition.
second, in my summary above i suggest a reading that synthesizes what are os
tensibly different and possibly conflicting theories of the origin of legitimate author
ity. Both the Aggañña Sutta and the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta offer theories about
the nature of political legitimacy. the Aggañña Sutta suggests that a king’s authority
rests on the initial consent of the people, and implies that subsequent kings inherit
authority as a birthright. the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta appears to offer a very differ
ent theory of legitimacy, based on the king’s personal spiritual purity (though rule still
appears to be passed to a male heir). an explanation of the relationship between the
two texts that is widely cited by other scholars43 is the one given by Balkrishna
Gokhale: “in the second phase of theorizing [the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta] the
early Buddhists endeavored to use the state to further the ends of dhamma by assert
ing the supremacy of the dhamma over āṇā [the power of the state].”44 on that
reading, the change from Aggañña Sutta to Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta represents a
strategic attempt on the part of the Buddha or sangha to benefit from state patronage
or protection, by depicting kings in a flattering light as possessing unusual spiritual
grace. in that way, Gokhale suggests, the sangha hoped to become the arbiter of pol
itical legitimacy by evaluating the spiritual fitness of kings.
in other places, however, Gokhale suggests that the change was due to the rap
idly increasing power of monarchical states during the Buddha’s lifetime and a desire
on the Buddha’s part to try to restrain state power.45 the Rajādhamma texts seem to
support this latter reading, indicating an effort on the part of the Buddha to restrain
kings. i am not convinced that there is really a problem here. the Aggañña Sutta and
Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta depict very different stages of government—the Aggañña
Sutta its origins, and the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta its perfection (and inevitable
cyclical decline). in the era depicted in the Aggañña Sutta, there had never been
kings. in the era depicted in the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta, kingship was an accepted
background fact about society, and the interesting question was how kings could be
better or worse. there does not seem to be any insuperable problem to reading them
synthetically, as i have proposed above.
Before we move on to the third and final controversy in the literature, we should
address one additional issue about the nature of legitimate authority in the canonical
texts. one of the main purposes of the social-contract tradition in Western thought
is to tell a story of the origins of coercive authority that appropriately respects the
moral autonomy and agency of the citizens. that is, one of the background assump
tions of Western thought (especially since the seventeenth century) is that society is
composed of more-or-less independent, rational individuals whose autonomy and
subjectivity must be respected by the political system for that system to be legitimate.
We see this illustrated very clearly, for example, in locke’s Second Treatise of Gov
ernment, where he argues that since human beings have all been created by God,
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and since we can therefore infer that God must want us to exist, it is a violation of
God’s will to harm any human being (including oneself) or hinder anyone from
peacefully pursuing their goals.46 this raises an additional problem for reading the
Aggañña Sutta as (resembling) a social-contract argument, because Buddhism rejects
the idea that human beings are at base atomistic, rational beings endowed with natu
ral rights. as will become clear below, this traditional Western conception of human
subjectivity conflicts directly with the anattā or no-self doctrine that the Buddha
taught. if human beings are not rational essences endowed with natural rights, the
idea that legitimacy arises from consent seems arbitrary rather than logically neces
sary. in other words, if human beings are ultimately just more-or-less contingent
phenomena, what does it matter whether they are ruled by someone they choose or
by someone who seizes power against their will? What exactly would be the norma
tive problem with that?
it might be tempting here to say that the concept of legitimacy doesn’t have a
place in Buddhist political theory, because it assumes that citizens have some kind
of natural essence (expressed as natural rights) that could either be respected or vio
lated. But draining the bathwater of legitimacy would also entail tossing out the baby
of normative political theory. at the end of the day, political theory just is the idea
that some forms of government are normatively good and others normatively bad, in
other words that some forms are legitimate and others are not. thus, if Buddhism is
to have a normative political theory, there must be some criterion of legitimacy other
than one based on the natural rights of rational individuals. i believe we get the clue
to that alternative criterion in the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta’s implicit lesson that
some forms of government elicit lower levels of social conflict and individual spiri
tual regress than others, in particular that rule by a spiritually advanced king mini
mizes social conflict while maximally encouraging individual spiritual progress. By
implication, any other type of rule would be less beneficial to the ultimate goal of
achieving enlightenment. thus legitimacy is not about adequately respecting the au
tonomy of rational selves, but rather about creating conditions to allow human be
ings to make spiritual progress (though, as i argue below, the political system can do
no more than create a conducive atmosphere—the individual must make the choice
to pursue enlightenment).
returning to the third and final controversy in the existing literature, there is the
question (mentioned above) about whether the Pāli canon texts really endorse mon
archy, or whether there is a subtle but detectable preference for republicanism pres
ent in them, as briefly sketched in the summary of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta above.
i believe that the evidence is overwhelming that the Pāli canon endorses monarchy
rather than republicanism, for several reasons. First, the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta is
the only place in the Pāli canon where the Buddha even appears to recommend re
publican government for lay society (as opposed to the community of monks or
sangha). in every other place where the Buddha discusses lay government, either
descriptively or prescriptively, he is talking about monarchy. second, when the
Buddha offers a utopian vision of a much better political future, at the stage of the
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Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta when humanity once again lives for eighty thousand years,
the form of lay government is still monarchy. indeed, the implication of the sine-wave
view of time that underlies the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta is that this would be the
best possible form of lay society: monarchy led by a spiritually advanced king, in an
era during which a fully enlightened Buddha is also teaching. Especially given the
semi-fantastic nature of the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta’s predictions of the future, this
would be precisely where we would expect the Buddha to endorse republicanism as
a distant-but-obtainable ideal; the fact that he did not do so suggests that the Buddha
did not see republicanism as the ideal for lay society.
Finally, it is worth taking seriously the differences between the sangha and lay
society. While it is true that the only society the Buddha ever set up, the sangha, was
republican, there are good reasons to think that the sangha may not have been in
tended as a model for the larger society. First, the sangha was an intentional com
munity, with a long list of rules and precepts whose violation could mean expulsion.
many of the typical social problems of the larger society could be eliminated without
the use of force in the more restrictive setting of the sangha. For example, the sangha
required celibacy, a practice that the Buddha never proposed for society at large.
second, the sangha could count on the guidance of (relatively) enlightened members
to help resolve disputes through peaceful discussion, again avoiding the use of force
or coercion that typifies government. thus, the sangha could employ republican
methods in part because it didn’t face the same problems as a lay political society.
For all of these reasons, i believe that we should treat the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta
as primarily emphasizing the value of tradition and continuity, rather than seeing it
as a subtle endorsement of republicanism. this suggests that when it comes to the
form of government, the Buddha either supported or acquiesced to monarchy as the
only practical form.
The Theory of Politics of Canonical Buddhism
seen solely as an endorsement of a political system, the political theory of the Pāli
canon is not of much interest—it’s just another iteration of the very familiar defense
of enlightened monarchy based on a primeval and unrecoverable social contract. We
find much the same theory in the Republic, the Leviathan, and Reflections on the
Revolution in France, among many other texts. if this were all Buddhism had to offer
us, it wouldn’t be worth the trouble. Happily, Buddhism has a great deal more to
offer, because the theory of politics that underlies the political system is radically dif
ferent from comparable theories in the Western tradition. in particular, the theory of
politics of the Pāli canon texts rests on three ideas: a deflationary account of the role
of politics in human life; an immanent theory of morality; and the claim that indi
vidual identity is both illusory and harmful. it is these three underlying arguments
that are really of value—indeed, the vast majority of Buddhists living today have
abandoned monarchy in favor of some form of republican government, though they
have preserved these underlying rationales of the Buddhist theory of politics.
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The Role of Politics in Human Life
it is overwhelmingly clear from the Pāli canon texts that the goal of Buddhism is in
dividual salvation (though there is considerable debate about whether one ought
to save oneself as soon as possible, or intentionally submit to continued rebirths to
help save others first). the content of the Buddha’s first sermon after achieving en
lightenment was the Four Noble truths, the core of the religion, which explain (1)
that life is suffering, (2) that suffering is caused by clinging, (3) that one could stop
suffering if one stopped clinging, and (4) that one could stop clinging by living ac
cording to eight guidelines called the Noble Eightfold Path.47 the entire focus is on
how individuals can make spiritual progress in escaping the cycle of reincarnation
and suffering.
that raises the question of the relative importance of politics to soteriology. is
politics integral to canonical Buddhism, such that individual salvation is significantly
affected by the political system under which one lives? or is politics of secondary
importance, such that it has a relatively small or even negligible effect on individual
spiritual progress? as Joanna macy correctly argues,48 politics must have some effect
on salvation, because the theory of causality put forward in the Pāli canon (called
paticcasamuppāda, or dependent co-arising49) argues that every condition is the re
sult of all previous causes in the universe. if politics exists, it has some effect on indi
viduals and their struggle for enlightenment.
But the Pāli canon texts themselves make clear that politics has a relatively small
effect on salvation, and that politics is relatively unimportant in human life. First,
there are a few places in the Pāli canon where the Buddha explicitly downplays the
importance of politics. as andrew Huxley points out, in the Saṃyutta Nikāya, māra
(a demon who is the personification of temptation and ill will) tempts the Buddha
by encouraging him to become a cakkavatti.50 the Buddha rejects the invitation.51
the spiritually advanced lay disciple citta rejects a similar invitation, from various
well-intentioned gods and spirits, that he strive to become a wheel-turning mon
arch in his next life.52 in both cases, it is clear that the grounds of refusal are that
even being a righteous ruler would be a distraction from the more important goal of
spiritual progress.
second, a closer reading of the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta offers substantial evi
dence against the idea that political factors are essential to achieving enlightenment.
the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta clearly places the historical Buddha’s own era, when
people lived to be one hundred (that is the typical human life span mentioned in
the Pāli canon), as being far inferior to the era in which a cakkavatti rules, and also
as being on the downward slope toward things getting worse.53 thus, it is apparently
possible to achieve enlightenment (as the Buddha and many members of the early
sangha did) without living under the rule of a cakkavatti, who, the Cakkavatti
Sīhanāda Sutta implies, appears only in the eras when people live to be eighty thou
sand years old. conversely, the text makes clear that the vast majority of people alive
during the reigns of the nine successive cakkavattis did not achieve enlightenment.
this indicates that while living under an enlightened ruler is helpful, that alone is not
enough to lead one to enlightenment.
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at the nadir of human existence, when people live for only ten years, it is some
of the people themselves who decide that they must improve their behavior, not a
cakkavatti or even an inferior king. thus, it appears that the people are capable
of moral self-reform, and do not require the help of a king, either good or bad. in
deed, the next cakkavatti will not appear until the people become so good that they
once again live for eighty thousand years, which won’t be for tens of thousands of
years. during that entire period, the people will continue to improve without the
guidance of a cakkavatti, though admittedly they will presumably have inferior kings
to help them (though, interestingly, the inevitable errors of those less-than-righteous
kings appear to be unable to derail the overall society’s moral progress). thus, while
the text overtly appears to say that the actions of the cakkavatti (i.e., the political
environment) determine whether the society is morally good or not, the structure of
the story suggests that in fact it is the moral goodness of the people/society that
makes the emergence of a cakkavatti possible in the first place. the cakkavatti then
clearly does have some influence on whether that moral goodness will be main
tained, but it also appears that political leaders are powerless to improve a society
that is already deteriorating, and that truly excellent political leaders don’t emerge in
morally bad times.
therefore, even the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta appears to say that while social
and political factors are relevant to the spiritual progress of individuals, they are not
determinative. a bad social environment cannot stop people who are determined
from making moral progress (witness the survivors of the generation that lives to ten),
and a generally good social environment cannot stop people from deteriorating mor
ally (witness the generation that lives to eighty thousand due to their general moral
goodness, but begins to behave immorally after the failed cakkavatti’s errors). Further,
the quality of government and social policies appears largely to follow from the
goodness of the people, rather than to lead it.
thus, while politics obviously plays some role in human life and has some effect
on how easy or difficult the individual finds it to achieve enlightenment, politics is
neither a central help nor a central hindrance to salvation. Politics simply isn’t that
relevant to the truly important things in life; at most it plays a supporting role.
Immanent Moral Theory
the Pāli canon texts depict an unusual moral universe, one that requires some inter
pretation and unpacking. First, as mentioned in the summary of the Aggañña Sutta
above, the universe has neither beginning nor end, only endless cycles of expansion
and contraction. Buddhism offers no theory about where the universe came from or
what its ultimate fate might be—in that way, it focuses on soteriology and avoids
eschatology.54 similarly, the universe is apparently spontaneously repopulated with
sentient beings during each expansion. Buddhism does not posit a creator god or
power, and actively works to depict the chief Vedic god, Brahma, as just one more
sentient being—an unusually powerful one, but not the creator of any aspect of the
universe.55 indeed, the Buddha teaches that the gods who think themselves to be
creators have merely forgotten their own origins, limitations, and mortality.56
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as in the Vedic religion from which it emerged, the fundamental force in the
Buddhist universe is kamma (skt: karma). in the Buddhist texts kamma is widely ex
plained as merely being cause and effect—every action leads to some reaction.57
there is no cosmic judge or accountant who tallies up one’s kamma and sends one
to one’s next incarnation; rather, one’s kamma creates a disposition or quality of
character that leads one naturally and inevitably to a uniquely suitable next life.
While the Pāli canon texts do sometimes talk of future incarnations as being rewards
or punishments,58 we should understand this language metaphorically—people in
essence choose their own next incarnations through their actions, and the justice is
poetic rather than juridical.
sentient beings are caught in a cycle of continuous rebirth called saṃsāra.
achieving enlightenment allows one to escape from saṃsāra, and after the death
of one’s body an enlightened person enters nibbāna (skt: nirvāṇa), about which the
Buddha was exceedingly vague. Various people tried to get the Buddha to clarify
whether nibbāna was a state of existence or nonexistence, and so on, but he refused
all such requests. all he said explicitly was that nibbāna was beyond suffering and
beyond birth and death.59 Human beings are uniquely well positioned to achieve
enlightenment. the implication seems to be that subhuman incarnations are so filled
with either misery or the struggle for survival that it is exceedingly difficult to behave
in a way that will lead either to a better incarnation or directly to enlightenment, and
that conversely the superhuman incarnations (as gods, demi-gods, and so on) often
lead beings to be both complacent and arrogant, such that spiritual progress stalls
or relapses.60 someone on the path toward enlightenment does not acquire more
and more “good” kamma, but in fact ceases to generate kamma.61 When one enters
nibbāna, one has no kamma at all.
as i suggested above, this is an immanent moral theory. there is no transcendent
source of rules or laws, no judge, no reward or punishment, no telos. Everything that
happens in this universe follows knowable laws. thus, for example, one’s next birth
is the natural consequence of one’s current, freely chosen actions (though these ac
tions are themselves influenced by one’s actions in previous lives). While each sen
tient being must inevitably make moral choices about his or her own behavior, there
is no outside authority that judges one. in a sense, the natural and the normative are
coextensive, in that the effects of good or bad kamma are both natural facts about
the universe and the basis of moral evaluation. For this reason, the Buddhist moral
theory is very similar to the later theories developed by Hobbes62 and spinoza.63 Fi
nally, it is worth noticing that the Buddhist moral universe is made up only of condi
tional imperatives: if you wish to escape saṃsāra and the suffering it entails, act in
this particular way. otherwise you are free to continue being reincarnated forever,
though of course the Buddha thinks that that is such an unappealing option that no
rational person would choose it. But, importantly, that would be a weak or foolish
choice, not an evil one.
Theory of the Self
in his second sermon after achieving enlightenment, the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta,64 the
Buddha taught that there is no self.65 Before we look at his arguments, it will be help48
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ful to take a step back and ask what we mean by a self. thinking abstractly, whatever
a self might consist in, it would have to have three basic qualities: identity, continuity,
and causality. First, the self would have to be that thing that makes you who you are,
that distinguishes you uniquely from all other human beings. second, the self would
have to exhibit relevant continuity over time, so that it would be true to say that you
are the same person today that you were twenty years ago and will be twenty years
from now.66 Finally, to preserve the first two qualities, the self would have to have an
unusual relationship to causality. it would have to be the primary cause of your ex
periences and actions, or else it would not fulfill the identity condition. of course
other factors would also be causally relevant, but without the self they would not
lead to your experiences. at the same time, the self would have to be largely immune
to being affected by other causes, or else it would not fulfill the continuity condition.
if the self could be changed by outside causes, it would not remain the same over
time, and you would not be the same person that you were twenty years ago.
in essence, the Buddha’s argument was that nothing in our experience has these
two causal qualities, and that therefore there is nothing that could be a self. on the
one hand, he argues that if any object of our experience (either internal or external)
were our self, then it should be able to exert some degree of volitional control over
other objects of our experience. For example, if the self were the same as our emo
tions, and if by hypothesis the self is the primary cause of our experiences, then it
seems that we ought to be able to exert volitional control over our emotions—that
we could choose to experience or not experience certain emotions at will. But, the
Buddha points out, we do not have that ability. the vast majority of the time, our
emotions rise and fall as if they were entirely independent of our will. the same is
true of all other objects of our experience. on the other hand, he argues, if the self
were identical with one or more of the objects of our experience, then we should
notice that some of the objects of our experience appear to be immune to causal
influences. yet our experience is precisely the opposite—both the internal and exter
nal worlds are entirely subject to causal influences, and the more carefully we look
the more fluid all aspects of our experience become. since no object of our experi
ence has the right causal properties of being causally efficacious over our experience
at will, while at the same time itself being immune to causal influences, there is no
object of our experience that we are justified in identifying as our self. since the only
other option for asserting the existence of a self would be to assume that there is a
self without any evidence, the Buddha concludes that there is no self.
adopting the no-self view isn’t merely an intellectual matter of adopting the right
position, no matter how counterintuitive it may be. rather, according to the Buddha,
accepting that there is no self is central to liberation and enlightenment. there are
a number of passages in the Pāli canon where the Buddha makes this point. Given
the limitations of space, i will quote only two. First, the Buddha argues that every
possible self-view will lead to suffering—that is, to the failure to overcome suffering
through achieving enlightenment. For example, in the Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta, the Bud
dha teaches that there are four kinds of clinging (recall that clinging is the root cause
of suffering): “clinging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, clinging to rules and
observances, and clinging to a doctrine of self.”67 Elsewhere the Buddha says:
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“Bhikkhus [monks], you may well cling to that doctrine of self that would not arouse
sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who clings to it. But do you see any
such doctrine of self, bhikkhus?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Good, bhikkhus. i too do not
see any doctrine of self that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and de
spair in one who clings to it.”68

these passages suggest that achieving the right insights and knowledge about the self
is central to liberation.
Theory of Politics
these three elements add up to a distinctive theory of politics. the most basic human
desire is happiness. Unfortunately, life is characterized not by happiness but by suf
fering. Even our happiest moments are marred by the knowledge that they must end,
that everyone involved must eventually sicken and die, and that even as we are en
joying them we are wasting precious time worrying about the future and fretting
about the past. Every human being has a natural and powerful incentive to try to es
cape from the suffering of life. that escape is possible, but only through individual
effort. the incentive to seek enlightenment is entirely pragmatic. there is no moral
duty to seek enlightenment, and one is perfectly free to continue in the cycle of
saṃsāra forever. since the universe is without beginning or end, there isn’t even a
threat of running out of time before making spiritual progress—when the universe
collapses and re-expands, one will simply be reborn and start right back into the
cycle of birth and rebirth.
it is helpful on the path to enlightenment to have support from like-minded
friends, and to live in a relatively peaceful and stable society, but neither of these
conditions is necessary—it is possible to achieve enlightenment without them. the
primary goal of politics is to ensure social stability and peace by promulgating laws
and rules, punishing violations, and preventing extreme poverty (which typically
leads to crime). Politics is a useful and inescapable human activity, since some hu
man beings will inevitably seek to benefit themselves at other people’s expense
through theft, violence, and fraud, and the victims of these actions will seek to create
laws and institutions to protect themselves. However, individuals have no moral duty
to participate in politics, and one should participate only to the extent that doing
so helps one make spiritual progress. typically, active participation beyond merely
obeying the laws and paying taxes will be a distraction from the more important goal
of individual salvation. Government actions and policies will inevitably have an ef
fect on the spiritual progress of the citizens, but that effect is not dispositive—good
policies will not ensure that individuals make progress, and bad policies cannot pre
vent them from making progress. obviously, helpful policies are to be preferred to
obstructive policies, but generally one should not take an active role in politics for
the purpose of making better policies, and should instead focus on one’s spiritual
life—indeed, the Buddha himself gave up his claim to the rule of a kingdom pre
cisely so that he could seek enlightenment, despite a prophecy that he would have
become a cakkavatti if he had become a political ruler.
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Finally, one of the key steps toward enlightenment is realizing the illusory nature
of the self. overcoming the illusion of the self has both soteriological and political
consequences. on the one hand, as discussed above, it is a necessary step in letting
go of clinging, and thus learning to suffer less from life. on the other hand, since the
basic problem of believing that one is or has a self is that it leads one to act egocen
trically, always seeking to fulfill one’s needs before or at the expense of the needs and
desires of others; letting go of the idea of the self should make one extremely un
likely to commit any crimes. although the Buddha never discusses this possibility, it
seems that a society made up entirely of enlightened individuals would operate ac
cording to some form of pacifist anarchism. Further, as the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta
clearly implies, a society of people who have each weakened, though not yet totally
eradicated, their sense of self would apparently be more harmonious and less con
flictual than the societies with which we are familiar (and the citizens would all live
to be eighty thousand years old!).
thus, government is both necessary and inevitable, but it doesn’t matter very
much what form it takes. in any event, one should not play an active role in govern
ment if one can avoid it. real social and political change and improvement will
come from the transformation of individuals; this is only modestly affected by politics
and is largely the responsibility of each person.
Conclusion: Why the Buddhist Theory is a Serious Alternative to Western Theories
it is important to appreciate just how different the Buddhist theory of politics is from
more familiar Western theories. While it is certainly true that we see bits and pieces
of this theory in the Western tradition, no one Western theory includes all of them, or
puts them together in this way. thus, for example, we certainly see a deflationary
attitude toward politics in some Western thinkers, such as with thoreau’s point that
he came to the world to live in it rather than to improve it,69 and in augustine’s pes
simism about the possibility of avoiding evil when involved in politics.70 yet both
thoreau and augustine argue that there are some circumstances—rare for thoreau,
common for augustine—under which one must nonetheless take an active role in
the political life of the community. We see nothing like this in the Pāli canon texts.
Someone has to run the society, but it needn’t be you, and in fact there will always
be someone else eager to do it, usually for all the wrong reasons.
more common in the Western tradition is the idea that participation in govern
ment is pragmatically necessary, morally obligatory, and/or the only path to full de
velopment of one’s capacities. We see this theme in the earliest works, such as in
Plato’s implicit argument in the Republic that no class of citizens can fully develop
its nature without the cooperation of the other classes through politics, and in aris
totle’s overt argument in the Politics that individual perfection and the good life can
be achieved only in the polis.71 that same theme recurs throughout the Western tra
dition, in augustine’s argument that christians have a moral duty to participate in
politics despite the likelihood that they will sin in the process,72 in locke’s as
sumption that political participation is the only rational course of action,73 in marx’s
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assertion that human beings can only achieve their full potential through active par
ticipation in a democratic and egalitarian society,74 in arendt’s valorization of the life
of action in the public sphere,75 in the value pluralists’76 argument that plurality re
quires a kind of constant political engagement, and in the civic republican emphasis
on self-cultivation through political participation. it is virtually always true that the
cure proposed for anomie, alienation, sectarian conflict, disempowerment, and other
political ills is . . . more politics!
Given the Western tradition’s emphasis on more and more politics, it is tempting
to treat the Buddhist argument that politics isn’t so very important as being an irre
sponsible quietism or the response of an elite that can shelter itself from the conse
quences of bad policies. indeed, slavoj Žižek argues just that.77 yet this response
misses the fact that the Buddha’s depreciation of politics successfully captures the
experience of many modern-day citizens. the Buddha’s advice is to participate in
the political system in whatever ways are required and/or typical—obey the laws,
pay your taxes, and vote for the candidates you think will enact the best policies. But
don’t expect politics to dramatically improve the society. change ultimately comes
additively, from the many personal transformations of individual citizens. yes, it
matters what happens in the world of politics, but what happens in the mind of each
individual matters more, not just for each individual personally (contra Žižek), but
for the society as a whole. to paraphrase rousseau, good laws cannot make good
citizens, and bad citizens cannot make good laws. only improving citizens can cre
ate improving laws. although patterns of political participation and engagement vary
widely among societies, this idea—that one should not expect fundamental social
change to be led by the political system—is a familiar feature of the politics of many
contemporary democracies. to the extent that this deflationary view reflects the
views of (some) modern citizens, the Buddhist theory of politics seems to be a better
fit for them than much of the Western theory tradition, whose optimism about politics
strikes many modern citizens as quaint.
the question of the relative value of the Buddha’s immanent system of morality
is more complex. there are a number of Western thinkers who have developed
roughly similar immanent systems, such as Epicurus and lucretius, spinoza, Ni
etzsche, Gilles deleuze and Féliz Guattari, William connolly, michael Hardt and
antonio Negri, and a number of other thinkers. However, these theories have typi
cally run into problems that the Buddhist theory might be able to avoid or at least
minimize. For the sake of analysis, it is helpful to think of immanent moral theories
as tending in three directions.78 some such theories are declarations—they make
strong metaphysical and ontological claims, upon which they base their immanent
moral systems. in this category we find thinkers like Epicurus and lucretius, with
their emphasis on the fateful clinamen or swerve that makes both change and free
will possible, as well as spinoza, whose system rests on a complex ontological argu
ment about the nature of the universe. the typical danger of such declarative theories
is that their ontological and metaphysical premises are inevitably both contestable
and contested, so that the theories end up being unable to demonstrate their prefer
ability to competing transcendental theories. readers are left to choose between
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competing unsupported assumptions, with no principled reason to choose one rather
than the others.
the second tendency among immanent theories is toward being merely
descriptions—such theories articulate an immanent worldview but avoid basing that
worldview on contestable premises, precisely to avoid the problems that declara
tive theories encounter. an example of a descriptive theory is Pyrrhonism, with its
emphasis on suspending belief about any claims not immediately obvious to the
senses.79 the typical problem of such theories is that by claiming so little they be
come in effect aesthetic preferences rather than theories of how the world works.
there is no strong reason to adopt such a theory, other than that it appeals to one.
Buddhism is an example of the third tendency among immanence theories, an
invitation. in essence, invitation theories try to split the difference between declara
tions and descriptions, by making some ontological and metaphysical assumptions,
but at the same time acknowledging that these assumptions are contestable, while
also seeking to maximize common ground. For example, William connolly, resting
his moral and political theories on various assumptions, explicitly points out that
these assumptions are contestable, and then invites his opponents to join him in ex
periencing how painful it is to have one’s most basic beliefs challenged. His bet is
that the recognition of the shared experience of the instability of one’s foundations
may itself become a novel basis for mutual respect and cooperation, at least on some
issues.80 Buddhism pursues a slightly different invitation strategy, by putting forward
some ontological and metaphysical claims and then arguing that all human beings
either already believe these claims or would come to do so if they were to reflect on
their experience. Buddhism adds two important qualifications to this approach. First,
it is not necessary to believe all of Buddhism’s claims to get the benefits of Buddhist
practice. For example, one can treat the theory of reincarnation as a metaphor rather
than a metaphysical fact, and yet still get many and possibly all of the benefits to be
had from meditation and following the Noble Eightfold Path. this is related to the
second qualification, which is the Buddha’s insistence that each individual must test
for him- or herself whether the Buddha’s teachings are true and helpful. the Buddha
articulated this point in response to a question from the Kalamas about how they
could know which of the various religious wanderers who visited them (including the
Buddha) were right. the Buddha’s answer was:
Now, Kalamas, don’t go by reports, by legends, by traditions, by scripture, by logical
conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement through pondering views, by prob
ability, or by the thought, “this contemplative is our teacher.” When you know for your
selves that, “these qualities are skillful; these qualities are blameless; these qualities are
praised by the wise; these qualities, when adopted & carried out, lead to welfare & to
happiness”—then you should enter & remain in them.81

invitation theories are more likely than declaration or description theories to be
successful in attracting the skeptical, largely because they try to maximize areas of
partial agreement while acknowledging the contestability of their inevitable assump
tions. in that way, they attract as many people as possible while driving away as few
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as possible. if that is correct, then Buddhism, as an invitation theory, is likely to be
one of the strongest immanence theories. to the extent that we are dissatisfied with
transcendent theories that rest on premises that the theories themselves refuse to see
as contestable, and to the extent that we are dissatisfied with immanence theories
that claim either too much or too little to be successful, we may find that invitation
theories, like the Buddhist theory, are the best ones available.
Finally, we come to the Buddha’s theory of the self. as i suggested above, this
theory is unique when compared with Western theories. a number of thinkers have
suggested that the self may be an illusion, from Kant82 and Hume83 to Nietzsche,84
derek Parfitt,85 antonio damasio,86 and others.87 But no one in the Western tradition
has argued that the self is an illusion that we could get rid of, or the further claim that
we would all be better off if we did get rid of it.
yet, not surprisingly, the Western philosophical tradition contains several differ
ent strands of thought about the self, which are more or less close to the Buddhist
position. the view that is the furthest from the Buddhist no-self theory is the Greek
and christian idea that human beings are or possess selves, and that these selves
are indestructible, immortal natural essences (i.e., souls). a view that takes one step
toward the Buddhist position is the idea that human beings are or possess selves, but
that these selves arise more-or-less contingently from the functioning of the body
and/or mind. in this group we get thinkers like William James, who argues that the
self is ultimately merely a way of talking about some aspects of the body;88 like Kant,
who argues that the mind’s perception of a single, unified self is merely the logically
necessary but empirically unverifiable corollary of the mind’s perception of external
objects extended in space and time;89 and finally like the contemporary “embodied
mind” school of thought, which builds off of phenomenology to suggest that our
experience of being selves may be rooted in both bodily and cognitive processes.90
the closest that Western thinking about the self gets to the Buddhist perspective
comes in the work of Hume,91 who suggests that the self is an illusion but one that
we cannot get rid of, and Nietzsche,92 who suggests that the self is an illusion that we
might turn to our own purposes. one influential line of contemporary Western
thought (which roughly corresponds to “postmodernism”) has built on the insights
of Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche to argue that identity is either largely or wholly con
tingent or constructed.93
Given this range of ideas, we can see, first, that while the Buddhist no-self posi
tion goes further in one direction than any influential Western theory,94 there are
similarities between the two traditions, and, second, that the Buddhist position ex
tends one of the Western approaches to its logical conclusion. the anattā doctrine
would not be shocking to Hume, Kant, or Nietzsche, though none of them would be
prepared to embrace it, and it, at the same time, represents the logical next step for
contemporary theories of the constructed and contingent nature of identity. thus, the
Buddhist theory is not so foreign that it could not enter into conversation with West
ern theories, and it presents the opportunity to extend more familiar theories in their
natural direction of development. For both reasons, it is simultaneously distinct from
Western theories and an appealing alternative (or supplement) to them.
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Further, the Buddhist theory adds a welcome alternative to Western theories of
the self by explaining how autonomy is possible without either assuming an essential
self or denying the causal influences of super-personal social forces. When we as
sume that there is an essential self, the question of autonomy gets posed as a meta
phor based on physics—we assume that the self is capable of arriving at a final de
termination about how to act, and then worry that various intervening forces, both
psychological and social, may prevent the self from acting in that way. We see the
self as having a certain momentum, and then wonder whether the opposing forces
will stop it in its tracks. although it is not obvious on its face, we use the same semi
conscious metaphor when we assume that the self is more or less the product of ex
ternal social forces. Because the particular self is the result of the effects of many
different forces, it is not identical with any one of them, and thus may have interests
or needs that are in opposition to some or all of them. in that way, it has unique in
terests that it might be able to assert interstitially, provided that it is not entirely
blocked by those various forces, either as they have been internalized as part of
the self (i.e., guilt) or as they continue to exist outside the self (i.e., as the police,
public opinion, and so on). in this view, autonomy consists in the self being able to
assert and pursue its idiosyncrasy despite being hemmed in by normalizing and ho
mogenizing forces. once again, we have a semi-conscious metaphor of opposing
forces—the self-determination of the individual versus the obstructions of various
aspects of power. and once again the problem of autonomy is cast as a problem of
the relative strength of the contending forces.
the Buddhist no-self position dissolves this problem by denying that there is a
self that has a single, determinate interest or agenda that it is pursuing. Even the
theory that sees the self as socially constructed nonetheless argues that the self is a
something, even if it is a constructed something. the Buddhist position flatly denies
this. there is no something that comes to a final and potentially effective decision
about how to act and that thus stands as a moving object opposed to other moving
objects and forces. rather than being an object, what we think of as the self is a
space, a forum, in which competing forces, both external and internal, interact. the
space or forum itself has no interests or goals. the actions of the human being are
ultimately determined by reconciliation of the various forces—the adding together of
forces pushing in the same direction, the canceling out of opposing forces, the veer
ing off course of one force influenced by another, and so on. in essence, this is the
same theory of decision making as that embraced by those who see the self as so
cially constructed, but without the anxiety. in this view, a human being can act against
social forces when the reconciliation of the various forces inclines one in that way.
among the active forces are all of the familiar internal ones like memory, conscious
ness, emotion, intention, knowledge, and so on. the Buddhist point is simply that
nothing helpful is added by saying that sometimes the reconciliation of forces is good
(autonomous) and sometimes it is bad (heteronomous)—it merely is what it is. if par
ticular outcomes cause either that human being or others to suffer, there will be feed
back that will itself become a force in future reconciliations, and perhaps the future
behavior of that person will be different. there isn’t anything else useful to be said.
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thus, if what we mean by autonomy is that the individual human being can
sometimes act against some of the external forces that influence it, then human be
ings do have autonomy. if what we mean is that the human being’s actions consis
tently reflect that person’s self, either being an intrinsic essence or a constructed
essence, then we do not have autonomy because we do not have such selves. in this
way, the Buddhist theory of the self manages to defang what is otherwise an insoluble
problem by undermining one of its shaky premises.
thus, overall, the Buddhist theory of politics is appealing because it envisions a
role for politics whose modesty is in keeping with the experience of many modern
citizens, rests on a moral theory that seeks to make positive claims while making as
few contestable assumptions as possible, and posits a theory of the self that clarifies
and simplifies the theories that many thinkers in the West had already arrived at. as i
have suggested, this theory deserves to be seen as a serious competitor with more
familiar Western theories. Hopefully recognition of this will lead Western theorists to
a more serious and sustained engagement with this rich, challenging, and in many
ways compelling tradition.
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